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Lessons Learned from Nearly Two Decades of Mediation Disuputes in American 
Federal and State Courts 
Abstract 
This article compares a recent five-year dataset (2013-2017) on mediation litigation trends with an earlier 
dataset (1999-2003) to make some general observations about mediation litigation trends over the last 
nineteen years, with a specific focus on enforcement of mediated settlements, the topic addressed by the 
Singapore Convention. 
Part II of this article provides a general overview of U.S. mediation litigation trends, including a detailed 
description of how the databases were created and caveats about their use, a summary of raw numbers, 
and a review of the common mediation issues litigated in U.S. Courts. Principal conclusions include the 
fact that litigation about mediation has steadily increased between 1999 and 2017, a time period when 
new civil filings in state and federal courts have been more or less constant, or in some years declined. 
Disputes about enforcement of mediated settlements remain the most commonly litigated topic; however, 
disputing about enforcement has significantly declined overall in proportion to all litigated mediation 
disputes. 
Part III offers a detailed examination of mediated settlement enforcement litigation, including types of 
enforcement disputes, defenses to enforcement, the enforcement-confidentiality connection, and 
significance of the subject matter of the underlying dispute. Principal conclusions include the fact that 
mediated settlements continue to be enforced at a very high rate—68% on average for the 2013–2017 
time period. The frequency with which parties raise “traditional” contract defenses such as whether there 
was a meeting of the minds or mistake, as well as challenges to fundamental fairness of the process 
through fraud or duress, have declined. In their place are a panoply of procedural and jurisdictional 
defenses which have increased in number as mediation gets institutionalized in statutes and court rules. 
As was true in the original 1999–2003 dataset, cases involving mediator malfeasance are exceedingly 
rare, and with a 95% settlement enforcement rate, virtually always a loser for the challenging party. 
Surprisingly, cases raising both enforcement defenses and confidentiality issues were far less common in 
2013–2017 compared to 1999–2003, and settlement enforcement far more likely in such cases in the 
recent time period. 
Part IV applies lessons gleaned from the litigation data to evaluate the choices made by the drafters of 
the Singapore Convention. From my perspective as a chronicler of “mediations gone bad,” there is much 
to praise in the drafters’ efforts. 
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EVALUATING THE SINGAPORE CONVENTION
 
THROUGH A U.S.-CENTRIC LITIGATION
 
LENS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM
 
NEARLY TWO DECADES OF
 
MEDIATION DISPUTES IN AMERICAN
 
FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS
 
James R. Coben* 
I. INTRODUCTION
This chapter assesses the likely efficaciousness of the Singa­
pore Mediation Convention1 based on nearly two decades experi­
ence of systematically tracking and studying mediation litigation in 
the U.S. federal and state courts. 
In the Spring of 2006, my colleague Peter N. Thompson and I 
authored our first study analyzing our comprehensive five-year 
dataset documenting mediation litigation trends from 1999–2003. 
The article, entitled Disputing Irony: A Systematic Look at Litiga­
tion About Mediation,2 made a number of findings relevant to the 
Convention, including among others: 
•	 Litigation involving mediation issues increased 95% from
1999 to 2003.3
•	 Nearly half of all court opinions about mediation ad­
dressed enforcement of settlement agreements. Tradi­
tional contract defenses, although frequently raised in 
enforcement cases, were rarely successful.4 
•	 Very few opinions raised the issue of mediator miscon­
duct;5 in fact, only seventeen times in five years did parties 
assert a contract defense based on mediator conduct.6
* Professor of Law and Senior Fellow in the Dispute Resolution Institute, Mitchell Hamline
School of Law. The author thanks Caleb Gerbitz, a student at Mitchell Hamline for his thought­
ful advice and top-notch technical expertise offered at all stages of this project. 
1 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Report of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Fifty-
first session, U.N. Doc. A/73/17, annex I (2018) [hereinafter Singapore Convention]. 
2 James R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Disputing Irony: A Systematic Look at Litigation 
About Mediation, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 43 (2006). 
3 Id. at 47–48. 
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•	 Courts are inclined to order mediation on their own initia­
tive and will generally enforce a pre-existing obligation to 
participate in mediation, whether the obligation was judi­
cially created, mandated by statute, or stipulated in the 
parties’ pre-dispute contract.7 
•	 Courts frequently consider evidence of what occurs in me­
diation; indeed, in over three hundred opinions courts ad­
dressed mediation communications without any mention of 
privilege or mediation confidentiality.8 
A year later, we published a follow-up article detailing two 
additional years of data analysis (2004–2005) and speculating about 
future trends.9  Although we then stopped systematically coding 
every mediation case for inclusion in a master database, we contin­
ued to monitor gross annual counts and squib the years’ most sig­
nificant cases for continuing legal education presentations and a 
variety of publications,10 including most significantly since 2011, for 
our work as co-authors (together with Sarah Cole, Nancy Rogers, 
Craig McEwen, and Nadja Alexander) of Mediation: Law, Policy 
& Practice, a Thomsen Reuters Trial Practice Series Treatise.11 
As Professor Thompson and I wrote back in 2007, “[w]e, of 
course, found it ironic and unfortunate that mediation, a process 
designed as an alternative to litigation, can, in some circumstances, 
encourage rather than eliminate additional litigation.”12 That dis­
puting irony continues to the present day, and I continue to believe 
that valuable lessons can be learned from mining the data. 
The run-up to the December 2018 General Assembly’s ap­
proval of the Singapore Convention inspired me to put my mining 
7 Id. at 105. 
8 Id. at 58–59. 
9 James R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Mediation Litigation Trends: 1999-2007, 1 WORLD 
ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 395 (2007). 
10 See, e.g., James R. Coben, My Change of Mind on the Uniform Mediation Act, 23 DISP. 
RESOL. MAG., Winter 2017, at 6; James R. Coben, Barnacles, Aristocracy and Truth Denial: 
Three Not So Beautiful Aspects of Contemporary Mediation, 16 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 
779 (2015); Sarah R. Cole, Craig A. McEwen, Nancy H. Rogers, James R. Coben & Peter N. 
Thompson, Where Mediation is Concerned, Sometimes ‘There Ought Not to Be a Law’!, 20 DISP. 
RESOL. MAG., Winter 2014, at 34; James R. Coben, Creating a 21st Century Oligarchy: Judicial 
Abdication to Class Action Mediators, 5 PENN. ST. Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 162 (2013); Peter N. 
Thompson, Good Faith Mediation in the Federal Courts, 26 OHIO  ST. J. ON  DISP. RESOL. 363 
(2011). 
11 SARAH R. COLE ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE (2018–2019). The treatise, 
updated annually and available online in Westlaw, contains detailed analysis of case law, as well 
as statutes and court rules on all of the topics addressed in this article. 
12 Coben & Thompson, supra note 9, at 395. 
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gear back on in earnest.  With the assistance of my extremely tal­
ented research assistant Caleb Gerbitz, I constructed a new dataset 
analyzing litigation about mediation for cases decided in 
2013–2017.  This article compares the new five-year dataset with 
the original 1999–2003 dataset to make some general observations 
about mediation litigation trends over the last nineteen years, with 
a specific focus on enforcement of mediated settlements, the topic 
addressed by the Singapore Convention. 
Part II of this article provides a general overview of U.S. medi­
ation litigation trends, including a detailed description of how the 
databases were created and caveats about their use, a summary of 
raw numbers, and a review of the common mediation issues liti­
gated in U.S. Courts. Principal conclusions include the fact that liti­
gation about mediation has steadily increased between 1999 and 
2017, a time period when new civil filings in state and federal 
courts have been more or less constant, or in some years declined. 
Disputes about enforcement of mediated settlements remain the 
most commonly litigated topic; however, disputing about enforce­
ment has significantly declined overall in proportion to all litigated 
mediation disputes. 
Part III offers a detailed examination of mediated settlement 
enforcement litigation, including types of enforcement disputes, 
defenses to enforcement, the enforcement-confidentiality connec­
tion, and significance of the subject matter of the underlying dis­
pute.  Principal conclusions include the fact that mediated 
settlements continue to be enforced at a very high rate—68% on 
average for the 2013–2017 time period.  The frequency with which 
parties raise “traditional” contract defenses such as whether there 
was a meeting of the minds or mistake, as well as challenges to 
fundamental fairness of the process through fraud or duress, have 
declined.  In their place are a panoply of procedural and jurisdic­
tional defenses which have increased in number as mediation gets 
institutionalized in statutes and court rules.  As was true in the 
original 1999–2003 dataset, cases involving mediator malfeasance 
are exceedingly rare, and with a 95% settlement enforcement rate, 
virtually always a loser for the challenging party.  Surprisingly, 
cases raising both enforcement defenses and confidentiality issues 
were far less common in 2013–2017 compared to 1999–2003, and 
settlement enforcement far more likely in such cases in the more 
recent time period. 
Part IV applies lessons gleaned from the litigation data to 
evaluate the choices made by the drafters of the Singapore Con­
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vention.  From my perspective as a chronicler of “mediations gone 
bad,” there is much to praise in the drafters’ efforts. 
First, the U.S. litigation experience strongly supports the Con­
vention’s singular focus on enforcement, as well as having minimal 
formalities necessary to trigger treaty application.  Second, the 
drafters’ choice to permit only an opt-out from treaty coverage and 
to generally assume that parties will want their agreements to be 
enforceable, arguably will maximize application of the treaty and 
in turn meet the drafters’ primary goal of promoting the use of 
mediation.  More important, in light of the recent U.S. litigation 
experience showing that procedural and jurisdictional defenses are 
becoming more common, the decision not to use an opt-in ap­
proach holds promise for significantly reducing post-mediation dis­
puting.  Third, limiting treaty coverage to cross-border commercial 
disputes and explicitly excluding family and consumer matters is 
certainly understandable, given an oft-cited concern for power im­
balances outside the business-to-business context.  However, per­
haps somewhat surprisingly, there is no evidence in the U.S. 
datasets to suggest that enforcement defenses are generally more 
common, or more successful outside the commercial context. 
Fourth, the grounds for refusal contained in Article 5 of the Con­
vention will most certainly permit the wide range of “traditional” 
contract enforcement defenses parties typically raise post-media­
tion, but will wisely limit challenges based on domestic law proce­
dural arguments and filing formalities, which given the recent U.S. 
experience, are an increasing share of enforcement litigation. That 
said, there is little in the litigation track record from the United 
States to suggest that the grounds for refusal based on mediation 
misconduct will be commonly invoked and even if invoked ever 
successful.  Finally, the drafters made a defensible choice to decline 
to legislate mediation confidentiality.  While I have in the past 
made a strong argument praising the merits of uniformity in confi­
dentiality regulation,13 the political reality is that getting agreement 
on a single approach to this complex topic (which depending on 
jurisdiction and legal culture might involve statutes, court rules, ju­
dicial decisions, ethical codes, ADR institutional provider policies, 
and/or party contract), would likely take many more years of nego­
tiation than the three the drafters devoted to the Singapore 
Convention. 
13 See Coben, My Change of Mind on the Uniform Mediation Act, supra note 10. 
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A. Building Datasets and Caveats About Their Use 
Both datasets14 were derived by searching for cases on 
Westlaw in the “ALLSTATES” and “ALLFEDS” databases that 
include the term “mediat!”.  As you might imagine, this search 
brings up a large number of “hits” on opinions that include some 
mention of mediation (most commonly, the fact that mediation at 
some point occurred before or during litigation). The number of 
total hits per year on the search term has increased from 1,176 in 
1999 to 5,137 in 2017 (by itself, a statistic implying considerable 
increased use of mediation in American courts). 
We then read each of the case “hits” to determine which opin­
ions arguably involved a judicial decision on some disputed media­
tion issue.  Only those cases are included in the datasets.15 
Admittedly, we made judgment calls about inclusion. For example, 
we excluded class action cases where the court merely acknowl­
edged that a settlement resulted from mediation, but included class 
action cases where the court explicitly cited the fact the case was 
14 The datasets are searchable Excel files, which can be viewed at the Mediation Case Law 
Project website I maintain at Mitchell Hamline School of Law (https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/ 
dri_mcldata/). Cross-tab functions within the Excel program (available as “Filter” options in the 
Excel “Data” toolbar) allow you to quickly tailor searches and combine variables (e.g., generate 
a list of state supreme court decisions where a mediated settlement was enforced despite an 
allegation of mutual mistake; or create a list of federal trial court decisions in a specific year 
where a judge enforced a contractual obligation to mediate). Both datasets capture case infor­
mation such as citation, year, jurisdiction, and level of court. Both datasets also identify the 
subject matter of the mediation disputing (e.g., enforcement, confidentiality, sanctions, duty to 
mediate, etc.). With respect to enforcement, the primary focus of this article, both datasets cap­
ture with specificity the nature of enforcement issues or defenses presented and their resolution 
(i.e., agreement enforced, not enforced, remanded, or modified or decided on other grounds). 
Due to time and workload limitations, the newer dataset has slightly fewer case variables. Also, 
unlike the initial dataset, the 2013–2017 compilation is organized by chapter sub-section of ME­
DIATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE, the mediation treatise I co-author for Thomson Reuters. 
See COLE ET AL., supra note 11. The revised organizational structure, while making it slightly 
more difficult to compare and contrast results between the datasets, greatly facilitates our work 
with annual treatise updates. I encourage researchers to use the datasets and ask only in return 
that you attribute them to me and Professor Thompson in any published work. 
15 It is important to keep in mind that some lawsuits involved multiple reported opinions. 
Because we wanted to study the extent to which mediation issues were being litigated and ad­
dressed by the courts, we treated each opinion involving a mediation issue as a separate entry. 
Consequently, the total number of opinions/entries is greater than the number of lawsuits. More­
over, a significant percentage of the cases involve more than one disputed mediation issue. 
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mediated as a reason to approve the mediated settlement.16  We 
included cases where the court referred to a “mediation” process 
involving a judge or court personnel unless we could clearly deter­
mine from the opinion text that the “neutral” did not act as a medi­
ator.  Conversely, we excluded cases the court labeled as judicial 
settlement conferences.17 
There are several caveats about the datasets. First, we discov­
ered that Westlaw continuously adds (and in some circumstances 
deletes) cases to its databases many months after case decisions 
occur.  Our final cut-off date for the 1999–2003 dataset was January 
31, 2005.  The cut-off date for the 2013–2017 dataset varied slightly 
from year to year but usually was in May or June of the following 
year.  Westlaw searches after these dates may likely reveal some 
additional cases and perhaps delete some we originally captured. 
Given the total number of potential dataset hits in these two five-
year periods (23,812),18 I readily acknowledge our review process 
may not have succeeded in reporting every single case deciding a 
disputed mediation topic.  Suffice it to say, we tried our best to be 
consistent in our inclusion/exclusion decisions. 
Second, case opinions published on Westlaw by no means cap­
ture the full range of disputing in American courts.  In many juris­
dictions, jurists have discretion regarding which cases to publish. 
While a steadily increasing number of federal trial court decisions 
are on Westlaw, far fewer state court trial decisions make it into 
the online database.  Presumably, a huge number of mediation dis­
putes of all types are resolved at the trial court level with unre­
ported decisions that are not appealed by any party to the dispute. 
Accordingly, it is quite possible that the big picture trends I report 
here could differ considerably from the reality of work in nation’s 
courthouses. 
Third, even for those judicial decisions published on Westlaw, 
readers know only the facts about the case that a judicial author 
decided to include in the opinion to support the ultimate ruling on 
16 See, e.g., Gallucci v. Gonzales, 603 Fed. Appx. 533, 534 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that the 
court’s conclusion that party bargaining occurred without collusion “is bolstered by the fact that 
the settlement was negotiated with the aid of a retired magistrate judge and experienced media­
tor, who reported no evidence of collusion”). See also infra notes 50–61 and accompanying text. 
17 See, e.g., Cornell v. Delco Elecs. Co., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1117 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (address­
ing an agreement arrived at in a “settlement conference” where the Magistrate Judge acted as a 
“go-between during negotiations.”). 
18 Over the entire seventeen years, “hits” on the search term yielded 63,078 opinions (which 
might partially explain why I am disinclined to create any future datasets on this particular 
topic)! 
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the merits.  The legally relevant facts from the court’s perspective 
may vary considerably from the parties’ (or mediator’s) perspec­
tive on what actually transpired during a mediation. 
Fourth, the trends reported here, which arguably can be char­
acterized as the maturation of mediation litigation over two de­
cades of institutionalization, might not, in the end, be at all 
predictive of the experience of other countries and disputing cul­
tures.  That, of course, remains to be seen. 
B. Raw Numbers 
The number of judicial opinions actually deciding a disputed 
mediation issue has risen from 172 in 1999 to 891 in 2017, as illus­
trated in Tables 1 and 2.  That more than five-fold increase in dis­
puting has occurred over a time period when civil filings in U.S. 
federal and state courts have been more or less constant,19 or dur­
ing the 2008 recession, in decline.20  The increase in cases was par­
ticularly steep in the 1999–2006 timeframe, with growth steady but 
at a slower rate in more recent years. The total relevant number of 
opinions, 11,216 over nineteen years, might seem insignificant on a 
national scale, especially when it seems safe to assume the total 
number of mediations throughout the country has increased sub­
stantially over the same time period.  Unfortunately, since many 
mediations are private matters, it is virtually impossible to deter­
mine with any accuracy the total number of mediations conducted 
in the United States on an annual basis.  Even court-annexed medi­
ations are difficult to quantify because court programs vary dra­
19 For example, according to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, new civil case 
filings in the federal district courts numbered 260,271 in 1999: see Judicial Business 1999, US­
COURTS.GOV, https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-business-1999 (last visited Apr. 
10, 2019); declined to 252,962 in 2003: see Judicial Business 2003, USCOURTS.GOV, https:// 
www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-business-2003 (last visited Apr. 10, 2019); increased 
to 267,257 five years later in 2008: see Judicial Business 2008, USCOURTS.GOV, https:// 
www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-business-2008 (last visited Apr. 10, 2019); rose again 
in 2013 to 284,604: see Judicial Business 2013, USCOURTS.GOV, https://www.uscourts.gov/statis­
tics-reports/judicial-business-2013 (last visited Apr. 10, 2019); and in 2017 declined to 267,769: 
see Judicial Business 2017, USCOURTS.GOV, https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial­
business-2017 (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
20 See, e.g., NAT’L  CTR. FOR  STATE  COURTS, TOTAL  INCOMING  CIVIL  CASES IN  STATE 
COURT  TRIALS, 2007–2016, http://www.courtstatistics.org/NCSC-Analysis/Civil/Civil-Caseloads­






























































1070CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION[Vol. 20:1063 
matically from state to state, and there is no single source of 
national data for use of mediation.21 
TABLE 1: NUMBER OF MEDIATION CASES PER YEAR, 1999–2017 





Federal State TOTAL 
One particularly interesting trend in the data is the shift from 
a majority of mediation disputes coming from state courts (true 
from 1999–2006) to a majority coming from federal courts (com­
mencing in 2007 and continuing to the current day). This increase 
is most likely attributable to the 2005 Congressional enactment of 
the Class Action Fairness Act,22 designed to “federalize” class ac­
tions.23  Indeed, according to a 2008 report of the Federal Judicial 
Center, federal class action diversity filings increased nearly three­
21 Even in the more unified federal court system, ADR data has been hard to come by. Just 
by way of example, it was not until 2018 that the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts specif­
ically referenced the extent of federal courts’ use of ADR in its annual report of court business. 
See U.S. District Courts—Judicial Business 2018, USCOURTS.GOV, https://www.uscourts.gov/sta­
tistics-reports/us-district-courts-judicial-business-2018 (last visited Apr. 10, 2019) (noting that 
“56 districts operated ADR programs of some form, and 53 of these districts provided mediation 
or judge-hosted settlement conferences. More than 25,500 civil cases were included in ADR 
programs.”). 
22 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (now codified at 
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)). 
23 See generally Patricia Hatamyar Moore, Confronting the Myth of “State Court Class Action 
Abuses” Through an Understanding of Heuristics and a Plea for More Statistics, 82 UMKC L. 
REV. 133 (2013) (describing CAFA goals and providing a detailed critique of the “mythology” of 
state class action abuses so routinely cited in support of the Act). 
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fold in 2006–2007.24  As described in more detail in Part III, this 
increase in federal court caseload has in turn significantly increased 
the number of mediation disputes in the datasets, given the degree 
to which federal  judges now routinely invoke the involvement of a 
private mediator as evidence that bargaining in a class action case 
was conducted at arms-length and without collusion between the 
parties.25 
TABLE 2: NUMBER OF MEDIATION CASES PER YEAR, 1999–2017 
DETAILED CASE COUNTS 
Year Federal Cases State Cases Total Cases 
1999 63 109 172 
2000 70 129 200 
2001 76 139 215 
2002 96 209 301 
2003 88 248 335 
2004 143 332 475 
2005 218 303 523 
2006 325 352 677 
2007 359 250 609 
2008 353 292 645 
2009 316 277 593 
2010 458 311 769 
2011 377 271 648 
2012 449 286 735 
2013 441 351 792 
2014 543 317 860 
2015 570 295 865 
2016 580 331 911 
2017 600 291 891 
24 EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL  CTR., THE  IMPACT OF THE 
CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: FOURTH INTERIM REPORT TO 
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 6–9 (2008). 
25 See infra notes 50–61 and accompanying text. I have written extensively about this phe­
nomenon elsewhere, believing it to be an unjustifiable form of judicial deference to the opinions 
of class action mediators. See Coben, Creating a 21st Century Oligarchy, supra note 10; Coben, 
Barnacles, Aristocracy and Truth Denial, supra note 10, at 790–95. 
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For the balance of this article, I will focus on two five-year 
time periods: 1999–2003 and 2013–2017. Why? First, while I 
tracked the total number of mediation cases throughout the 
nineteen-year period, I systematically coded case details only in 
twelve of those years (including the two five-periods).  Second, 
comparing two five-year periods a decade apart strikes me as an 
effective way to evaluate big picture trends in disputing.26 
As illustrated in Table 3, there were 1,223 reported opinions 
involving significant mediation issues in the 1999–2003 five-year 
period.  The number of opinions increased from 172 in 1999 to 335 
in 2003, reflecting a 95% increase.  State court opinions constituted 
68% of the overall total, and more than doubled in number over 
five years.  Federal court opinions constituted just 32% of the over­
all total, with the number of opinions issued each year remaining 
relatively constant over the five-year period. 
TABLE 3: NUMBER OF MEDIATION CASES PER YEAR IN EACH 
5-YEAR PERIOD 














1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Federal State Federal State 
Total 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total 1223 172 200 215 301 335 
Federal 387 63 70 75 92 87
State 836 109 130 140 209 248 
Total 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Total 4319 792 860 865 911 891 
 Federal 2731 441 543 570 580 600 
State 1588 351 317 295 331 291 
Quite a different picture emerges a decade later. While the 
total number of cases significantly increased (from 1,223 in 
1999–2003 to 4,319 in 2013–2017), the pace in annual increases 
over the five-year period slowed substantially.  In 2013, courts is­
sued opinions about mediation disputes 792 times; in 2017, there 
26 For detailed reporting on the two years (2004 and 2005) left out of this comparison, see 
Coben & Thompson, Mediation Litigation Trends, supra note 9. 
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were 881 decisions, an overall caseload increase of just 12.5%. 
State court opinions constituted just 37% of the overall total and 
declined in number from 351 in 2013 to 291 in 2017. Federal court 
opinions constituted 63% of the overall total, with the number of 
federal court opinions increasing each year, from 441 in 2013 to 600 
in 2017. 
C. Disputed Mediation Issues 
As illustrated in Tables 4 and 5, the disputes about mediation 
are quite diverse.  Disputes about enforcement of mediated settle­
ments constituted close to half of all mediation disputing in 
1999–2003.27  That percentage dropped to 39% in 2013–2017. In 
both five-year periods, disputes about fees and costs of mediation28 
were the second largest category of mediation litigation: 20% of all 
disputed cases in 1999–2003; 13% of all disputed cases in 
2013–2017. 
In 1999–2003, the third most frequent dispute was about court 
power to compel mediation,29 occurring in 13% of the cases, fol­
lowed by confidentiality disputes,30 which occurred in 12% of the 
cases.  Sanctions were a topic of disputing 10% of the time,31 as 
was condition precedent, most commonly whether a statutory or 
contract obligation to mediate before litigation or arbitration was 
satisfied.32  Ethics issues, including both alleged failures of 
mediators and judicial officers adjudicating mediated cases oc­
27 For detailed analysis, see Part III infra, notes 46–72 and accompanying text. 
28 For a detailed analysis of mediation fee and cost cases, see COLE ET AL., supra note 11, 
§§ 9:17–9:20. See also Coben & Thompson, supra note 2, at 112–19. 
29 For a detailed analysis of cases addressing court power to compel mediation, see COLE ET 
AL., supra note 11, § 9:2 (noting “[s]uccessful challenges to judicially compelled mediation are 
rare.”). See also Coben & Thompson, supra note 2, at 105–08. 
30 Confidentiality disputes were wide-ranging, including among many other things: applica­
bility of evidentiary exclusions and privilege law, waiver of privilege, discovery challenges, limi­
tations on mediator reports, public right of access, court sanction for wrongful disclosure, as well 
as complex choice of law problems. For a detailed analysis of mediation confidentiality law, see 
COLE ET AL., supra note 11, §§ 8:1–8:49. See also Coben & Thompson, supra note 2, at 57–73. 
31 For a detailed analysis of sanctions cases, see COLE ET AL., supra note 11, §§ 9:3–9:16. See 
also Coben & Thompson, supra note 2, at 119–23. 
32 For a detailed analysis of condition precedent cases, see COLE ET AL., supra note 11, § 6:4. 
See also Coben & Thompson, supra note 2, at 105 (“[c]ollectively, the . . . opinions support a 
simple principle: courts are inclined to order mediation on their own initiative, and will generally 
enforce a pre-existing obligation to participate in mediation, whether the obligation was judi­
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curred in 6% of the cases.33  Procedural implications of a mediation 
request or participation constituted 4% of the disputing,34 followed 
by lawyer malpractice at 3%,35 and other acts and omissions as the 
basis for independent claims at 2%.36 




DISPUTED ISSUE 2013–2017 
(4319 total cases)
569 47% Enforcement 1668 39% 
243 20% Fees/Costs  566 13% 
157 13% Court Power to Compel Mediation  238 6% 
152 12% Confidentiality 358 8% 
123 10% Condition Precedent 404 9% 
117 10% Sanctions  172 4% 
68 6% Ethics (Judicial and Mediator) 96 2% 
50 4% Procedural Implications of
Mediation Request or Participation
 498 12% 
31 3% Lawyer Malpractice 65 2% 
20 2% Act or Omission as Basis for  
Independent Claims 
207 5% 
6 1% Arbitration-Mediation Waiver 59 1% 
By 2013–2017 the relative frequency of disputed issues shifted 
in some interesting ways.  Most relevant to the Singapore Conven­
33 For a detailed analysis of ethics cases involving judicial officers, see COLE ET AL., supra 
note 11, § 10:16. For detailed analysis of ethical claims against mediators, see COLE ET AL., supra 
note 11, §§ 10:5–10:14. See also Coben & Thompson, supra note 2, at 95–105. 
34 See COLE ET AL., supra note 11, §§ 5:12–5:16, where my treatise co-authors and I have 
grouped this wide array of case disputing into four broad categories: 1) cases raising tolling, 
laches, and failure to prosecute issues (§ 5:13); 2) cases where parties used mediation participa­
tion (or failure to participate) to influence litigation timelines and/or excuse rule violations 
(§ 5:14); 3) cases where mediation was used to establish waiver of rights, notice of claims, and 
exhaustion of administrative remedies (§ 5:15); and 4) cases where mediation participation im­
pacted jurisdiction, venue, and transfer issues (§ 5:16). 
35 For a detailed analysis of lawyer malpractice issues, see COLE ET AL., supra note 11, § 12:4. 
See also Coben & Thompson, supra note 2, at 90–94. 
36 For a detailed analysis of acts and omissions leading to other claims, see COLE ET AL., 
supra note 11, §§ 15:17–15:19. See also Coben & Thompson, supra note 2, at 90–94. 
37 The total number of issues raised exceeds the number of total cases because opinions 
often address more than a single disputed mediation issue. 
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tion, the percentage of cases raising enforcement issues declined 
17% (from 47% of all cases in 1999–2003, down to 39% in 
2013–2017).38  Disputes about confidentiality also showed marked 
decline, down 33%;39 as did fee/cost disputes, down 35%;40 dis­
putes about court power to compel mediation, down 54%;41 dis­
putes about sanctions, down 60%;42 and disputes raising ethical 
concerns about mediators or the judges deciding disputed media­
tion issues, down 66%.43 
The frequency of disputing about enforcing statutory or con­
tractual obligations to mediate before litigation or arbitration re­
mained more or less constant, with the issue being litigated in 10% 
of the cases in 1999–2003 and 9% of the cases in 2013–2017.44  The 
same pattern held for disputes alleging waiver of arbitration rights 
by virtue of mediation participation, with the issue addressed in 
1% of the cases in both five-year periods. 
The growth area in mediation litigation are disputes about 
procedural implications of mediation request or participation. 
These disputes have increased three-fold, increasing from 4% of all 
cases in the 1999–2003 dataset to 12% of the cases in 2013–2017.45 
Cases alleging acts or omissions in mediation as a basis for new 
38 And, as detailed infra at notes 62–72 and accompanying text, the percentage of those 
enforcement cases raising “traditional” enforcement defenses (such as whether there was a 
meeting of the minds or mutual or unilateral mistake, as well as challenges to fundamental fair­
ness of the process through fraud or duress) declined even more. 
39 Confidentiality disputes were raised in 12% of all cases in 1999–2003 but only 8% of cases 
in 2013–2017. 
40 Attorney’s fees and mediation costs were raised in 20% of all cases in 1999–2003 but only 
13% of cases in 2013–2017. 
41 Dispute about court power to compel mediation were raised in 13% of all cases in 
1999–2003 but only 6% of cases in 2013–2017. 
42 Sanctions disputes were raised in 10% of all cases in 1999–2003 but only 4% of cases in 
2013–2017. 
43 Ethics issues were raised in 6% of all cases in 1999–2003 but only 2% of cases in 
2013–2017. 
44 However, it should be noted that in this time period more than a third of the 404 cases 
(156 or 39%) came from a single state—Nevada, and involved that state’s foreclosure mediation 
statute. Without the disputing attributed to this single statute, the frequency of disputing about 
statutory obligations to mediate would have been closer to 6% of all cases, rather than 9%. 
45 As I wrote in the Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution in 2015, “[r]oughly a decade ago, 
I first began to joke that it might be possible for me to teach my first year civil procedure course 
using only case law decisions about disputed mediation issues. That is no longer a hypothetical.” 
Coben, Barnacles, Aristocracy and Truth Denial, supra note 10, at 783 (following up the observa­
tion with a long list of case citations and parentheticals detailing disputes about mediation rais­
ing issues addressing, among other things, subject matter jurisdiction, venue, transfer, service of 
process, attachment, choice of law, discovery relevance, work-product, failure to state a claim, 
waiver of defenses, joinder, summary judgment, dismissals, appeals, and res judicata). 
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claims also have become more common, rising from just 2% of all 
cases in 1999–2003 to 5% of all cases in 2013–2017. 
TABLE 5: DISPUTED MEDIATION ISSUE 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 
Enforcement 
Attorney’s Fees/Mediation Costs 




Ethics (Mediator and Judicial) 
Procedural Implications of Mediation 
Lawyer Malpractice 
Acts or Omissions as Basis of New Claims 
Arbitration/Mediation Waiver 
1999-2003 Cases (percentage frequency) 2013-2017 Cases (percentage frequency) 
Given that the Singapore Convention focuses exclusively on 
enforcement of mediated settlements, the next section explores in 
detail the data relevant to that topic. 
III. DISPUTING MEDIATION SETTLEMENT ENFORCEMENT IN 
U.S. FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 
A. Types of Enforcement Disputes 
As a threshold matter, it is helpful to divide enforcement dis­
putes into three distinct categories.  First, a considerable amount of 
litigation (29% in the 1999–2003 dataset; 23% in the 2013–2017 
dataset) are disputes about interpretation and/or alleged breach of 
mediated settlements.46  This is distinct from cases where a party 
46 See, e.g., Lester v. Percudani, 511 Fed. Appx. 174 (3d Cir. 2013) (interpreting the scope of 
a release); Reilly v. Carpenter, No. 14–1260, 2015 WL 6143382, *4 (W. Va. Oct. 16, 2015) (con­
cluding that failure of both parties to timely perform the “contingencies” found in their medi­
ated settlement agreement did not preclude the trial court’s conclusion that the agreement was 
binding and enforceable); Butler v. Caldwell, No. 48931-3-I, 622 WL 554952, at *3–4 (Wash. Ct. 
App. Apr. 15, 2002) (determining that a delivery of an appraisal by fax started the three day 
period for rejection set forth in the mediated settlement agreement); Caswell v. Anderson, 527 
S.E.2d 582, 584 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (interpreting clause in mediated settlement agreement set­
ting forth compensation for withdrawing partner). 
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raises a defense to settlement enforcement, the topic specifically 
addressed in Article 5 of the Singapore Convention.47  Enforce­
ment defenses, discussed in more detail below,48 were raised in 
65% of the cases in the 1999–2003 dataset, but only in 37% of the 
cases in the 2013–2017 dataset—a 43% reduction in disputing 
about defenses.  Finally, a third category of enforcement cases in 
the datasets involve class action litigation or other contexts where 
courts exercise settlement approval authority, such as settlements 
on behalf of minors or Fair Labor Standards Act disputes, where 
the relevant statute requires judicial approval.  Here, there is a dra­
matic change in case counts between the datasets, with virtually all 
the increase attributable to class action litigation.  In 1999–2003, 
just 34 (31 federal and 3 state) or 6% of the enforcement cases 
involved judicial approval of class actions or other contexts de­
manding judicial approval of mediated settlements.  In the more 
recent dataset, 2013–2017, there are 601 class action cases (595 fed­
eral and 6 state) constituting 36% of all enforcement disputes.49 
That is a rather remarkable six-fold increase in frequency, worth 
just a bit of explication here, despite the fact that the Singapore 
Convention excludes from its scope settlements, like court-ap­
proved class action settlements, that are enforceable as 
judgments.50 
47 Singapore Convention, supra note 1, art. 5 (Grounds for Refusing to Grant Relief). 
48 See Part III.B, infra notes 62–72 and accompanying text. 
49 The balance of 661 cases in this category are predominantly Fair Labor Standards Act 
cases, where courts approved mediated settlements and specifically referenced the mediation 
effort as an indicia of fairness. There were also in this category a handful of minor settlement 
approval cases. 
50 Singapore Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(3)(a). See generally Timothy Schnabel, The 
Singapore Convention on Mediation: A Framework for the Cross-Border Recognition and En­
forcement of Mediated Settlements, 19 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1, 25–27 (2019). 
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TABLE 6: TYPE OF ENFORCEMENT DISPUTE 
1999-2003 Enforcement Cases 2013-2017 Enforcement Cases 
(569 cases total) (1668 cases total) 
Interpretation and Breach (29%) 165 cases 
Enforcement Defense (65%) 372 cases 
Class Action (or other settlements requiring 
judicial approval) (6%) 34 cases 
Interpretation and Breach (23%) 387 cases 
Enforcement Defense (37%) 620 cases 
Class Action (or other settlements requiring 
judicial approval) (40%) 661 cases 
In the vast majority of civil disputes resolved by mediation in 
the United States, the parties’ settlement ends any ongoing litiga­
tion without judicial review or approval of the settlement agree­
ment.51  Most typically, the underlying lawsuit (assuming there was 
one) is dismissed with prejudice, and the parties’ mediated settle­
ment agreement is a new contract that, if breached, becomes the 
subject of an entirely new legal proceeding—a contract action for 
enforcement or breach.52  Class action settlements, in contrast, fol­
low a different path to finality. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(e) mandates that class actions may be settled “only with court 
approval.”53  While the precise factors vary from federal circuit to 
federal circuit, the general objective of court review is to protect 
class members “whose rights may not have been given due regard 
by the negotiation parties.”54  As I have documented elsewhere in 
51 See Coben, Creating a 21st Century Oligarchy, supra note 10, at 163. See generally COLE 
ET AL., supra note 11, § 7:19 nn.50–51 and accompanying text. 
52 Id. 
53 FED R. CIV. P. 23(e) (providing that “[t]he claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class 
may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s approval.”). 
54 Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of San Francisco, 688 F.2d 615, 624 (9th Cir. 
1982) (noting that “[t]he class action device, while capable of the fair and efficient adjudication 
of a large number of claims, is also susceptible to abuse and carries with it certain inherent 
structural risks.”). 
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great detail,55 judges increasingly discharge this oversight duty by 
invoking mediation evidence, all the more so in federal courts since 
the 2005 passage of the Class Action Fairness Act.56  Specifically, 
judges cite the involvement of a private mediator as evidence that 
bargaining in a class action case was conducted at arms-length and 
without collusion between the parties.57  Courts not only cite medi­
ator testimony on process fairness, they often go further to recite 
and credit mediator evidence on substantive merits of the very set­
tlement the mediator brokered,58 a development that has always 
55 Coben, Barnacles, Aristocracy and Truth Denial, supra note 10, at 790–93; Coben, Creat­
ing a 21st Century Oligarchy, supra note 10, at 167–74. See also COLE ET AL., supra note 11, 
§ 7:17 nn.24–34 and accompanying text. 
56 See supra notes 37–39. 
57 See, e.g., Jones v. Singing River Health Servs. Found., 865 F.3d 285, 295–96 (5th Cir. 2017), 
cert. denied sub nom. Almond v. Singing River Health Sys., 138 S. Ct. 1000, 200 L. Ed. 2d 252 
(2018) (concluding that “objectors failed to show that, even if a conflict of interest existed, the 
settlement negotiations themselves were unfair or collusive” where “[t]o the contrary, the dis­
trict court relied heavily on the fact that a well-recognized neutral mediator oversaw settlement 
negotiations of the federal cases to ensure they were conducted at arms’ length”); In re Fab 
Universal Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 148 F. Supp. 3d 277, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (stating that 
“[t]he Proposed Settlement was the product of extensive formal mediation aided by a neutral 
JAMS mediator, hallmarks of a non-collusive, arm’s-length settlement process”); ABF Freight 
Systems, Inc. v. U.S., Nos. C 10–05188 SI, 11–04663, 2013 WL 3244804 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2013) 
(citing the fact that the agreement was reached in mediation with a neutral mediator as evidence 
that there was no collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct connected with obtaining the settlement); 
In re Citigroup Inc. Sec. Litig., 965 F.Supp.2d 369, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (observing that “[f]rom 
his front row seat, the mediator concluded that “negotiations in this case were hard fought and at 
arm’s-length at all times”); In re LivingSocial Mktg. and Sales Practice Litig., 298 F.R.D. 1, 11 
(D. D.C. 2013) (reciting mediator testimony that “[t]here was never any type of collusion be­
tween the Parties in any of the negotiations,” and that the parties’ negotiations “were intense at 
every step of the way, and the Parties vigorously advocated for their respective positions”). For 
historical documentation of this practice and many more case citations and parentheticals, see 
supra note 55. 
58 See, e.g., In re MGM Mirage Sec. Litig., 708 F. App’x 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2017) (emphasiz­
ing that “the parties reached a settlement after extensive negotiations before a nationally recog­
nized mediator, retired U.S. District Judge Layn R. Phillips” and “the district court properly 
relied on Judge Phillips’s declaration stating that the settlement ‘represent[ed] a well-reasoned 
and sound resolution of highly uncertain litigation’ and was ‘the product of vigorous and inde­
pendent advocacy and arm’s-length negotiation conducted in good faith.’”); Johansson-Dohr­
mann v. CBR Sys., Inc., No. 12-cv-1115-MMA (BGS), 2013 WL 3864341, *8 (S.D. Cal. July 24, 
2013) (citing mediator testimony that “the settlement reached between the parties was the prod­
uct of arm’s-length and good faith negotiations . . .” [and] “is non-collusive, fair and reasonable 
to all parties and provides significant benefits to the Settlement Class.”) (emphasis added); In re 
Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F.Supp.2d 503, 509–10 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing 
mediator testimony that “it is my opinion that the [S]ettlement[s] w[ere] achieved through a fair 
and reasonable process and [are] in the best interest of the class . . . the court system and the 
mediation process worked exactly as they are supposed to work at their best; a consensual resolu­
tion was achieved based on full information and honest negotiation between well-represented and 
evenly balanced parties”) (emphasis added). 
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struck me as a particularly unwarranted judicial abdication of 
power, not to mention the posing of a rather obvious conflict of 
interest.59 
Only a very small minority of judicial officers have resisted the 
trend, most notably the Honorable William Alsup, who in Kakani 
v. Oracle Corp.,60 rejected the parties’ joint motion for preliminary 
approval of a mediated class action settlement, and pointedly 
opined: 
[i]t is . . . no answer to say that a private mediator helped frame 
the proposal.  Such a mediator is paid to help the immediate 
parties reach a deal.  Mediators do not adjudicate the merits. 
They are masters in the art of what is negotiable.  It matters 
little to the mediator whether a deal is collusive as long as a deal 
is reached.  Such a mediator has no fiduciary duty to anyone, 
much less those not at the table.61 
B. Defenses to Enforcement 
1. Overall Enforcement Rates 
While the relative frequency of enforcement defense disputes 
has declined, as shown in Table 7 below, the likelihood that a set­
tlement will be enforced in the face of an alleged contract defense 
has increased from 57% of the time to 69%. 
59 See Coben, Barnacles, Aristocracy, and Truth Denial, supra note 10, at 175–87. 
60 Kakani v. Oracle Corp., No. C 06-06493 WHA, 2007 WL 2221073 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 
2007). See also In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 948 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(observing that “the mere presence of a neutral mediator, though a factor weighing in favor of a 
finding of non-collusiveness, is not on its own dispositive of whether the end product is a fair, 
adequate, and reasonable settlement agreement”); Martin v. Cargill, Inc., 295 F.R.D. 380, 86 
Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1593 (D. Minn. 2013) (stating that applying the presumption that a settlement 
reached through mediation was an arm’s length, fair settlement was highly doubtful where no 
formal discovery had taken place and the nature of any informal exchange of information was 
not presented to the court); Lusby v. Gamestop, Inc., 297 F.R.D. 400, 413 (N.D. Cal. 2013) 
(expressing a concern when the mediation was conducted privately and not subject to court 
oversight). 
61 Kakani v. Oracle Corp., 2007 WL 2221073, *11. 
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TABLE 7: HOW OFTEN SETTLEMENTS ENFORCED WHEN 
DEFENSE RAISED (AS PERCENTAGE) 









Enforced Not Enforced Remanded Modified 
1999-2003 2013-2017 









210 57% Enforced 426 69%
77 21% Not Enforced 118 19% 
47 13% Remanded 50 8% 
38 10% Modified or decided  
on other grounds
 26 4% 
2. Specific Enforcement Defenses: Frequency and Success Rates 
Table 8 shows the frequency of particular defenses in each 
dataset.  In 1999–2003, the six most common defenses raised— 
those adjudicated in 10% or more of the enforcement cases—were 
(in declining order of frequency): no meeting of minds; lack of for­
mality;62 fraud; mistake (mutual or unilateral); agreement to agree; 
and duress. 
62 Lack of formality includes such things as lack of a required writing or signature, or failure 
to include statutorily required language. See, e.g., Haghighi v. Russian-American Broadcasting 
Co., 173 F.3d 1086, 1087–88 (8th Cir. 1999); Haghighi v. Russian-American Broadcasting Co., 
945 F. Supp. 1233, 1234–35 (D. Minn. 1996), certified question answered, 577 N.W.2d 927 (Minn. 
1998), rev’d, 173 F.3d 1086 (8th Cir. 1999) (refusing to enforce an otherwise fair mediation 
agreement signed by the parties that stated it was a “Full and Final Mutual Release of All 
Claims” but did not include the magic words required by relevant state statute that the parties 
intended the agreement to be binding). See generally James R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson, 
The Haghighi Trilogy and the Minnesota Civil Mediation Act: Exposing a Phantom Menace Cast­
ing a Pall Over the Development of ADR in Minnesota, 20 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 299, 324 
(1999) (arguing that the insistence on technical terms in mediated settlement agreements con­
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TABLE 8: ENFORCEMENT DEFENSE FREQUENCY 
1999–2003 (372 opinions) 2013–2017 (620 opinions)
Number of
Opinions
Percentage of Total 
Enforcement 
Opinions63 
Enforcement Defense Number of
Opinions
Percentage of Total 
Enforcement 
Opinions64 
78 21% No Meeting of Minds 78 13% 
62 17% Lack of Formality 76 12% 
54 15% Fraud 63 10% 
52 14% Mistake 43 7% 
47 12% Agreement to Agree 38 6% 
36 10% Duress 65 10% 
20 5% Attorney Lack of
Authority 
36 6% 
17 5% Mediator Misconduct 16 3% 




13 3% Public Policy 26 4% 
12 3% Undue Influence 6 1% 
11 3% Unconscionability 15 2% 
3 1% Incapacity 23 4% 
61 16% Miscellaneous 69 11%
In the 2013–2017 dataset, the relative frequency of many of 
these “traditional” defenses declined, with procedural or jurisdic­
tional challenges taking over a larger share of the overall disput­
ing—24% of the cases, compared to only 4% of the cases in the 
earlier dataset.  This most rapidly expanding category of disputing, 
which we did not even include in the original case coding question­
naire in 1999–2003 because so infrequent in that time frame, in­
volves such things as whether the court had jurisdiction to hear the 
matter,65 whether the parties had exhausted administrative reme­
trary to community expectations creates uncertainty in whether mediation settlements are en­
forceable “casting a pall over the development of ADR in Minnesota”). 
63 Since opinions often evaluate more than a single enforcement defense, the total exceeds 
100%. 
64 Id. 
65 See, e.g., Melchor v. Eisen & Son Inc., No. 15CV00113 (DF), 2016 WL 3443649, at *8 
(S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2016) (finding no independent basis for federal jurisdiction for the enforce­
ment of a mediated settlement agreement where the court had not expressly retained jurisdiction 
to enforce the settlement, but nonetheless granting relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) because 
the court’s premature dismissal was a “mistake” removing any incentive for compliance with the 
agreement); In re Paternity of S.A.M., 85 N.E.3d 879, 889 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (declaring the 
trial court’s order for the parties to conduct mediation, the resulting mediated agreement grant­
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dies,66 or had taken the necessary steps in the prior proceeding or 
in this proceeding to raise the issue or preserve the issue for 
review.67 
Duress cases constituted 10% of the disputing in both 
datasets.  Disputing about attorney lack of authority and incapacity 
increased ever so slightly, the former increasing from 5% to 6%, 
the latter from 1% to 3%.  Defenses based on public policy were 
also slightly more common, rising for 3% of cases in 1999–2003 to 
4% of cases in 2013–2017. 
The overall frequency of the miscellaneous category of de­
fenses—admittedly a catch-all for a wide variety of attacks on en­
forcement ranging from allegations of general unfairness,68 to 
assertion of “traditional” but rarely invoked contract theories,69 to 
use of arguably creative but ultimately failed avenues of attack70— 
fell slightly, with such cases representing 16% of all enforcement 
disputes in 1999–2003 but only 13% of disputes in 2013–2017. 
And what do the datasets show about success of these various 
defenses?  Table 9 shows how often agreements were enforced de­
spite a particular defense being raised.  In both datasets, defenses 
ing visitation rights, and the trial court’s order approving the agreement all void ab initio because 
the father lacked standing to bring the underlying paternity action). 
66 See, e.g., Furlough v. Spherion Atl. Workforce, LLC, 397 S.W.3d 114, 126 (Tenn. 2013) 
(holding that the plaintiff employee did not have to again exhaust administrative remedies 
before petitioning the trial court to set aside his mediated worker’s compensation settlement). 
67 See, e.g., Boyd v. Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 697 F. App’x 397, 398 (5th Cir. 2017) 
(concluding that where no stipulation of dismissal had been filed and the trial court had not yet 
issued a final judgment, a party’s challenge to the validity of a mediated settlement agreement 
was premature); Krechuniak v. Noorzoy, 11 Cal. App. 5th 713, 726–27, 217 Cal. Rptr. 3d 740, 
751–52 (Ct. App. 2017) (precluding party from arguing on appeal that a mediated settlement 
included an invalid penalty provision where the issue was not presented to the trial court). 
68 See, e.g., Byrd v. Byrd, No. 2150124, 2016 WL 3568725, at *9 (Ala. Civ. App. July 1, 2016) 
(rejecting the argument that financial hardship posed by imminent retirement made a mediated 
alimony agreement inequitable); Peterson v. Peterson, 765 N.E.2d 827 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002), 
rev. denied, 772 N.E.2d 590 (Mass. June 27, 2002) (rejecting theory that mediation process was so 
devoid of procedural safeguards “as to deprive the husband of due process”). 
69 See, e.g., Nelson v. Levy Ctr., LLC, No. CV 9:11-1184-SB-BHH, 2016 WL 1276414, at *5 
(D.S.C. Mar. 30, 2016) (rejecting applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel where de­
fendant failed to establish, among other things, any injury sustained in relying on alleged 
promises in the agreement); Cook v. Hughston Clinic, P.C, No. 3:14-CV-296-WKW [WO], 2015 
WL 6082397, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 15, 2015) (deeming both parties’ words and actions as incon­
sistent with the continued existence of the settlement agreement and applying the doctrine of 
rescission to find the otherwise valid and binding agreement no longer enforceable); Gray v. 
Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., No. 62408, 2014 WL 504605 (Nev. Jan. 21, 2014) (finding ade­
quate consideration to support enforcement of a mediated settlement). 
70 See, e.g., Edney v. Edney, No. S.CT.CIV. 2015-0051, 2016 WL 3188938, at *3 (V.I. June 7, 
2016) (confirming that a party’s misunderstanding of the law is not a valid ground to set aside a 
contractual obligation). 
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related to fundamental fairness of the process such as mediator 
misconduct, duress, undue influence, fraud, unconscionability, and 
incapacity were all rejected at a higher rate than the average for 
the respective five-year period.  This rejection of fairness defenses 
is particularly robust in the more recent dataset.  In 2013–2017, 
where the overall average enforcement rate was 69%: alleging me­
diator misconduct as a defense to enforcement failed 100% of the 
time; unconscionability claims were rejected 93% of the time; du­
ress defenses were rejected 88% of the time; incapacity claims were 
rejected 87% of the time; and fraud defenses were only marginally 
more successful, with an enforcement rate of 86%. 
The lowest enforcement rate is where parties raised procedu­
ral or jurisdictional arguments.  In 1999–2003, such defenses were 
rejected outright only 33% of the time, with an additional 27% of 
the cases being remanded for additional proceedings.  In 
2013–2017, procedural/jurisdictional arguments continued to be the 
most successful attacks on mediated settlements, with an enforce­
ment rate of just 53%, well below the 69% average rate.  And as in 
1999–2003, these defenses were also more likely than average to 
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1999–2003 (372 opinions) 2013–2017 (620 opinions) 









75% Undue Influence 83% 
71% Mediator Misconduct 100% 
69% Fraud 86% 
69% Mistake 74% 
66% Incapacity 87% 
64% Duress 88% 
64% Unconscionability 93% 
60% Attorney Lack of Authority 75% 
59% Miscellaneous 74% 
57% No Meeting of Minds 60% 
55% Agreement to Agree 68% 
50% Lack of Formality 67% 
46% Public Policy 69% 
33% Procedural/Jurisdictional Challenges 53% 
3. The Enforcement-Confidentiality Connection 
The common wisdom is that enforcement and confidentiality 
are closely linked.71  The datasets, in contrast, suggest litigation 
only relatively rarely involves both issues. As shown in Table 10, 
between 1999 and 2003, courts considered both enforcement de­
fenses and confidentiality challenges in thirty-eight cases (just 10% 
of all enforcement defense cases in that time period). 
71 See, e.g., Ellen E. Deason, Enforcement of Settlement Agreements in International Com­
mercial Mediation: A New Legal Framework?, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2015, at 32, 36 (noting 
that “presenting evidence of contract defenses often spawns tensions with confidentiality protec­
tions.”); Peter N. Thompson, Enforcing Rights Generated in Court-Connected Mediation—Ten­
sion Between the Aspirations of a Private Facilitative Process and the Reality of Public 
Adversarial Justice, 19 OHIO  ST. J. ON  DISP. RESOL. 509, 515 (2004) (observing that “the 
penchant for confidentiality and secrecy, resulting in overlapping privilege rules, makes it diffi­
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TABLE 10: THE ENFORCEMENT-CONFIDENTIALITY CONNECTION 
1999–2003 (38 cases where a
court considered both
enforcement and 
confidentiality issues) 10% of 
all enforcement defense cases 
DISPOSITION 2013–2017 (29 cases where a
court considered both
enforcement and 
confidentiality issues) 5% of all 









11 29% Enforced 19 66% 
13 34% Not Enforced 8 28% 
7 18% Remanded 2 7% 
7 18% Modified or 
decided on other 
grounds
0 0% 
In the more recent 2013–2017 time period, courts grappled 
with both enforcement defenses and confidentiality issues only 
twenty-nine times, just 4% of all cases raising an enforcement de­
fense.  The sharp decline in this issue-linking is somewhat surpris­
ing given that combining these issues together during the 
1999–2003 time period significantly increased the likelihood that an 
agreement would not be enforced.  Indeed, while the overall settle­
ment enforcement rate in that time period was 57%, it dropped 
dramatically to 29% when parties disputed both enforcement and 
confidentiality.  In 2013–2017, not only did the frequency of linking 
those issues substantially decline, but the dramatic differential in 
enforcement rates when the issues were linked virtually disap­
peared altogether (a 66% enforcement rate when linked, compared 
to a 69% enforcement rate when not). Together with the overall 
decline in litigation about confidentiality issues,72 these statistics 
suggest that confidentiality frameworks for mediation are working 
relatively efficiently and predictably for parties. 
4. Significance of the Subject Matter of the Underlying Dispute 
The underlying subject matter of the disputes involving en­
forcement defenses has been remarkably stable. As shown in Ta­
ble 11, enforcement-defense disputing in the commercial context 
increased ever so slightly, from 54% of the cases in 1999–2003 to 
56% of the cases in 2013–2017. Very slight increases also occurred 
72 See Table 5, supra notes 27–45 and accompanying text (noting that confidentiality disputes 
constituted 12% of all mediation litigation in 1999–2003, but only 8% of all mediation litigation 
in 2013–2017). 
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in the family law and employment contexts. Family law cases were 
30% of enforcement defense cases in 1999–2003 and 31% of the 
cases in 2013–2017.  Employment law cases were 10% of enforce­
ment defense cases in 1999–2003 and 11% of cases in 2013–2017. 
In contrast, estate/probate enforcement-defense disputes declined, 
dropping from 6% of all cases in 1999–2003 to only 2% in 
2013–2017. 




1999-2003 Cases Raising an Enforcement 2013-2017 Cases Raising an Enforcement 
Defense (372 cases total) Defense (620 cases total) 
General Civil (54%) [200 cases] General Civil (56%) [347 cases] 
Family (30%) [112 cases] Family (31%) [190 cases] 
Employment (10%) [37 cases] Employment (11%) [69 cases] 
Estate/Probate (6%) [23 cases] Estate/Probate (2%) [14 cases] 
Do enforcement rates vary based on subject matter context? 
Table 12 shows the enforcement rates for the four categories of 
cases: general civil, family, employment, and estate/probate.  In the 
1999–2003 dataset, the enforcement rates were virtually identical 
for all four case types, with the exception that defenses raised in 
the estate/probate context were slightly less likely to fail (52% en­
forcement when contrasted with the overall 57% average enforce­
ment rate).  In the 2013–2017 dataset, employment disputes were 
the most likely to be enforced despite defenses (71% enforcement 
rate), with general civil and family law cases both being enforced at 
a 69% rate.  Once again, enforcement defenses were most success­
fully adjudicated in the estate/probate context, where agreements 
were enforced against challenges only 50% of the time. 
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1999–2003 (372 opinions) 2013–2017 (620 opinions) 
57% Overall Enforcement Rate 69% Overall Enforcement Rate 
How Often Agreement 
Enforced Despite Defense 
Raised 
Subject Matter of 
Underlying Dispute
How Often Agreement 
Enforced Despite Defense 
Raised 
57% General Civil 69% 
56% Family 69% 
57% Employment 71% 
52% Estate/Probate 50% 
IV. EVALUATING THE SINGAPORE CONVENTION IN LIGHT OF
 
THE U.S. LITIGATION EXPERIENCE
 
As noted above, there is certainly no guarantee that the U.S. 
litigation experience with mediation will be replicated in other ju­
risdictions.  Nonetheless, these litigation trends provide at least 
some empirical data against which to evaluate decisions, both polit­
ical and practical, made by the drafters of the Singapore Conven­
tion.  In particular, I will focus on six things: 1) the choice to focus 
on enforcement; 2) the wisdom of minimal formalities and an opt-
out approach; 3) subject matter treaty exclusions for vulnerable 
parties; 4) grounds for refusing to grant relief; 5) concerns about 
mediator malfeasance; and 6) confidentiality. 
A. A Sensible Focus on Enforcement 
The Singapore Convention creates a legal framework for rec­
ognition and enforcement of mediated settlement agreements 
made in the context of international commercial business disputes. 
As Timothy Schnabel, former head of the U.S. delegation to the 
Convention Working Group puts it, mediated settlements qualify­
ing for enforcement under the Convention will “be able to circu­
late across borders in their own right, without the need to rely on 
domestic contract law or being transformed into an arbitral award 
on agreed terms.”73 
73 Timothy Schnabel, Implementation of the Singapore Convention: Federalism, Self-Execu­
tion, and Private Law Treaties, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. (forthcoming 2019), available at https:// 
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Why elect to focus on enforcement?  Perhaps most important 
is the perspective of international commercial mediation users. 
Recent empirical surveys suggest strong support for a global en­
forcement framework, akin to what the New York Convention ac­
complished for arbitration.74  In a perfect world, since mediation is 
based on consent and self-determination, one might be excused for 
thinking that parties using the process would live up to their obliga­
tions.  But the reality is that they do not always do so, as aptly 
demonstrated by the U.S. mediation litigation experience docu­
mented in Part III infra, which shows that disputing about enforce­
ment of mediated settlement agreements has always been the most 
common issue addressed in mediation litigation. 
The Convention drafters initially discussed whether to include 
enforcement of agreements to mediate in addition to enforcement 
of mediated settlement agreements.75  That dual-track approach 
would have mirrored the New York Convention, which provides 
for enforcement of agreements to arbitrate,76 as well as arbitral 
ssrn.com/abstract=3320823, at 2. According to the Convention’s Preamble, the enforcement 
framework will “contribute to the development of harmonious international economic rela­
tions.” Singapore Convention, supra note 1, at Preamble. 
74 See, e.g., S.I. Strong, Use and Perception of International Commercial Mediation and Con­
ciliation: A Preliminary Report on Issues Relating to the Proposed UNCITRAL Convention on 
International Commercial Mediation and Conciliation (University of Missouri School of Law Le­
gal Studies Research Paper No. 2014-28, Nov. 17, 2014), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2526302 (reporting that 74% of survey respondents believe a Conven­
tion on enforcement would encourage increased use of mediation and conciliation in their coun­
tries, “with only 8% of respondents taking the contrary view.”). See also Schnabel, supra note 
50, at 3 (noting that “UNCITRAL was presented with evidence that mediated settlements are 
seen as harder to enforce internationally than domestically, which was said to disincentivize the 
use of mediation to resolve disputes” and further noting that “[m]any companies find it hard to 
convince their business partners in some jurisdictions to engage in mediation based on views that 
it lacks a stamp of international legitimacy like the New York Convention has given to arbitra­
tion since 1958.”). 
75 See generally S.I. Strong, Beyond International Commercial Arbitration? The Promise of 
International Commercial Mediation, 45 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 11, 32–34 (2014) (recom­
mending that a Convention address enforcement of agreements to mediate and suggesting that 
drafters could turn to the UNCITRAL Model Conciliation Law “for inspiration, since that in­
strument includes some very good language concerning the enforcement of an agreement to 
mediate as well as provisions relating to the rejection or termination of an offer to mediate”). 
76 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, art. II(1) (providing that “[e]ach Con­
tracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to sub­
mit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in 
respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter 
capable of settlement by arbitration.”). 
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awards.77  The drafters ultimately declined to legislate enforcement 
of agreements to mediate, primarily out of concern the issue would 
overcomplicate the drafting effort.78  The U.S. litigation experience 
would suggest this choice should be relatively non-controversial. 
As noted above in Part II(C), disputes about court power to com­
pel mediation were just 6% of all cases in 2013–2017 (down from 
13% in 1999–2003), while disputes about contractual or statutory 
obligations to mediate were 9% of all cases in 2013–2017 (down 
from 10% in 1999–2003).79  Regardless of the overall frequency of 
disputing, successful challenges to court-compelled mediation are 
rare,80 and courts “will generally enforce a pre-existing obligation 
to participate in mediation, whether the obligation was judicially 
created, mandated by statute or stipulated in the parties’ pre-dis­
pute contract.”81 
B. The Wisdom of Minimal Formalities and Opt-out Approach 
The Singapore Convention requires only minimal formalities 
as a condition of providing enforcement relief82 and permits opt-
out from treaty coverage only by declaration83—in other words, a 
default approach that generally assumes that parties want their 
agreements to be enforceable.  Both were wise drafting choices 
that will limit the type of litigation about formalities and party in­
77 Id. art. I(1) (providing that “[t]his Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforce­
ment of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where the recogni­
tion and enforcement of such awards are sought, and arising out of differences between persons, 
whether physical or legal. It shall also apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic 
awards in the State where their recognition and enforcement are sought.”). 
78 See generally Schnabel, supra note 50, at 14. See also Edna Sussman, The Singapore Con­
vention: Promoting the Enforcement and Recognition of International Mediated Settlement Agree­
ments, 3 ICC DISP. RESOL. BULL. 42, 49 (2018) (noting that “[w]hether or not agreements to 
mediate are enforceable and whether they are considered conditions precedent that preclude the 
progression to employing other dispute resolution modalities varies across jurisdictions.”); Dea­
son, supra note 71, at 34 (calling it sensible to separate enforcement of settlements from enforce­
ment of agreements to mediate, noting that “as a practical matter, garnering support for a less 
ambitious legal instrument would probably be easier” and questioning whether enforcement is 
needed to initiate mediation). 
79 But see supra note 44 (emphasizing that more than a third of the condition precedent cases 
in 2013–2017 addressed the foreclosure mediation statute of a single state, Nevada). 
80 COLE ET AL., supra note 11, § 9:2. 
81 Coben & Thompson, supra note 2, at 105. 
82 Singapore Convention, supra note 1, art. 4. 
83 Id. art. 8(1)(b). 
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tention to be bound that regularly appears in the U.S. mediation 
litigation datasets, both old and new.84 
Under the Convention, a settlement must be signed by the 
parties,85 with an authorized option for electronic signature.86  The 
party seeking relief under the Convention must offer evidence that 
mediation has occurred,87 including among other easy to prove op­
tions, the mediator’s signature on the agreement.88  While a num­
ber of delegations expressed concerns about the mediator being 
the source of such evidence,89 it is a common exception to confi­
dentiality in a number of U.S. statutory frameworks, including the 
Uniform Mediation Act,90 which expressly authorizes a mediator 
to report whether mediation occurred, as well as party attendance 
and whether a settlement was reached.91  The 2005 AAA/ABA/ 
ACR Revised Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, the 
most widely cited ethical code of conduct for mediators in the 
United States, also expressly authorizes mediator reports regarding 
84 See COLE ET AL., supra note 11, § 7:19 (observing that “[i]ncreased formality requirements 
are intended to guard against surprise and uncertainty, to protect confidentiality, and to reduce 
litigation” but often end up “creat[ing] the surprise, uncertainty, and increased litigation”). See, 
e.g., Haghighi v. Russian-American Broadcasting Co., 945 F. Supp. 1233, discussed supra note 
62; In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 2013 WL 6326707 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (holding it 
insufficient that the parties intended, at the time of contract formation, to be bound by the 
mediated settlement terms, where their agreement did not include a statement to the effect that 
their settlement was intended to be enforceable or binding). 
85 Singapore Convention, supra note 1, art. 4(1)(a). 
86 Id. art. 4(2)(a). 
87 Id. art. 4(1)(b). See Schnabel, supra note 50, at 30–31 (noting that “[t]he stated reason for 
imposing this requirement was to reduce the risk of fraud and to make it easier for competent 
authorities to ensure that the settlement was indeed mediated”). 
88 Singapore Convention, supra note 1, art. 4(1)(b)(i). Other options for such evidence in­
clude the mediators’ separate written attestation that mediation occurred, a written statement 
from the institution administering the mediation, or in the absence of those listed methods, “any 
other evidence acceptable to the competent authority.” See Singapore Convention, supra note 1, 
art. 4(1)(b)(ii)–(iv). For a more complete analysis of Article 4 proof, see SING. REF. BK., Allan J. 
Stitt, The Singapore Convention: When has a Mediation Taken Place (Article 4)?, 20 CARDOZO J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 1173 (2019). 
89 See generally Schnabel, supra note 50, at 31–32 (noting, among other things, the concern 
that mediators in some jurisdictions are trained not to sign a settlement). 
90 For detailed information about the Act, including full text as adopted (with or without 
reporter’s notes), superseded drafts, and legislative fact sheet, see Mediation Act, UNIFORM LAW 
COMMISSION, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=4556 
5a5f-0c57-4bba-bbab-fc7de9a59110w (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
91 See Unif. Mediation Act § 7(b)(1) (“A mediator may disclose . . . whether the mediation 
occurred or has terminated, whether a settlement was reached, and attendance”). For additional 
statutory and court rules addressing mediator reports, see COLE ET AL., supra note 11, § 8:40. 
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attendance and whether or not a settlement was reached.92  The 
European Code of Conduct for Mediators likewise authorizes me­
diator disclosure when “compelled by law or grounds of public pol­
icy.”93  The bottom line: the Convention requirement for minimal 
formality will do little to chill mediator performance, is consistent 
with many jurisdictions’ existing approach to confidentiality, and 
will avoid a particularly robust category of litigation—disputing 
about enforcement of oral agreements94 and “magic word” require­
ments like those in my home state of Minnesota95 or California.96 
The Convention’s “opt-out” approach is also likely to signifi­
cantly reduce overall litigation.  Signing states may exercise a reser­
vation right to declare that the Convention applies only if parties 
have agreed to its application,97 but absent that reservation or ex­
press contractual agreement of parties to negate Convention appli­
cation,98 the Convention applies without the necessity of private 
party contracting on the topic.  This seems best aligned with the 
common understanding of disputing parties.99 
92 See 2005 AAA/ABA/ACR REVISED MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS 
Standard V(A)(2) (permitting mediator to report “if required, whether parties appeared at a 
scheduled mediation and whether or not the parties reached a resolution.”). 
93 See EUROPEAN CODE OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS § 4 (“The mediator must keep con­
fidential all information arising out of or in connection with the mediation, including the fact 
that the mediation is to take place or has taken place, unless compelled by law or grounds of 
public policy to disclose it.”). 
94 COLE ET AL., supra note 11, § 7:5 (cataloguing dozens of oral enforcement disputes, in­
cluding seventeen state supreme court decisions). 
95 Under Minnesota’s Civil Mediation Act, a mediated settlement agreement must state spe­
cifically that the agreement is binding, that the parties were advised in writing that the mediator 
has no duty to protect the parties’ interests or to inform them about their legal rights, that 
signing the settlement agreement might adversely affect their rights, and that they should consult 
with an attorney before signing or if the parties are uncertain of their rights. See Minn. Stat. 
§ 572.35(1). 
96 See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1123 (providing that a written mediated settlement agreement can 
be admissible only if the “agreement provides it is admissible,” “enforceable,” or contains 
“words to that effect.”). 
97 Singapore Convention, supra note 1, art. 8(1)(b) (“A Party to the Convention may declare 
that: . . . (b) It shall apply this Convention only to the extent that the parties to the settlement 
agreement have agreed to the application of the Convention.”). 
98 Parties who affirmatively by agreement opt-out of Convention application would satisfy 
the refusal ground in Convention, art. 5(1)(d) (“granting relief would be contrary to the terms of 
the settlement agreement.”). 
99 See Eunice Chua, The Singapore Convention on Mediation—A Brighter Future for Asian 
Dispute Resolution, ASIAN J. INT’L L. 1, 5–6 (2019) (noting that requiring affirmative opt-in 
could be contrary to the expectations of the parties as they would generally expect the other 
party to comply with the settlement agreement and thus its possible enforcement, citing Report 
of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on the Work of its Sixty-sixth Session, UNCITRAL, 
UN Doc. A/CN.9/901 (2017), para. 36.); Deason, supra note 71, at 36 (noting that “[a]n opt-out 
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C. Justifiable Exclusions? 
The Convention applies to agreements resulting from media­
tion to resolve international commercial disputes.100  Disputes aris­
ing from transactions involving consumers, as well as family, 
inheritance, and employment law are specifically excluded from 
coverage.101  A primary motivation for these exclusions is the per­
ception that in these contexts parties are more likely to be victims 
of unequal bargaining power.102  As one commentator has opined, 
“crafting desirable protections for relatively unsophisticated par­
ties subject to adhesion agreements would overly complicate a con­
vention.  Furthermore, absent this exclusion, a convention would 
run afoul of mandatory laws protecting such parties, which fre­
quently are stronger outside the United States.”103 
Does the litigation track record in the United States provide 
any evidence to support the assumption that parties might be more 
“at risk” when mediating in certain subject matter categories?  Sur­
prisingly, there is very little in the datasets to justify this concern. 
framework makes sense from the perspective of maximizing use of the convention’s enforcement 
mechanisms” as “[r]esearch has shown that default rules are ‘sticky,’ meaning that parties tend 
not to alter them.”). That said, the opt-in, opt-out choice was hotly debated. See Schnabel, supra 
note 50, at 57–59. See also Sussman, supra note 78, at 49 (summarizing the underlying policy 
conundrum as offering contrasting views of self-determination and party autonomy, with one 
perspective positing these prime values would be best served by convention application only 
where the parties have expressly consented to be bound, whereas others emphasize the counter-
intuitiveness of requiring parties “to confirm their consent to enforce their obligations under a 
settlement agreement.”). 
100 Singapore Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(1) (“This Convention applies to an agreement 
resulting from mediation and concluded in writing by parties to resolve a commercial dispute 
(‘settlement agreement’) which, at the time of its conclusion, is international . . .”). 
101 Id. art. 1(2) (“This Convention does not apply to settlement agreements: (a) concluded to 
resolve a dispute arising from transactions engaged in by one of the parties (a consumer) for 
personal, family, or household purposes; (b) relating to family, inheritance or employment 
law.”). 
102 See generally Schnabel, supra note 50, at 23–24. 
103 Deason, supra note 71, at 33–34; SING. REF. BK., Ellen E. Deason, What’s in a Name? The 
Terms “Commercial” and “Mediation” in the Singapore Convention on Mediation, 20 CARDOZO 
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1149 (2019). See also Dorkas Quek Anderson, Supporting Party Autonomy 
in the Enforcement of Cross-Border Mediated Settlement Agreements: A Brave New World or 
Unchartered Territory? in MAX  PLANCK  INSTITUTE  LUXEMBOURG  SUMMER  SCHOOL-INTERNA­
TIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PROCEDURAL LAW SUMMER SCHOOL 2018: PRIVATIZING DISPUTE RES­
OLUTION AND  ITS  LIMITS para. 43 (Nomos, 3d ed. 2018), available at https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=3304587 (noting it is “common practice in commercial mediations to have legal repre­
sentation to protect parties against any pressure exerted by the mediator. Hence, the assumption 
of arms-length negotiations within contract law may not be too far from the reality in cross-
border commercial mediations.”). 
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As noted supra in Table 12, the percentage at which agreements in 
a particular subject matter context are enforced despite an enforce­
ment defense tend not to vary from the overall enforcement aver­
ages.  Estate/probate cases are a clear exception, with enforcement 
defenses succeeding in that context at a relatively higher rate when 
compared to the average (52% settlement enforcement rate in 
1999–2003 dataset compared to the average rate in that time period 
of 57%; 50% settlement enforcement rate in 2013–2017 dataset 
compared to the average rate of 69%).  On the one hand, this dis­
parity might well be attributable to the vulnerability of parties in 
that particular bargaining context, exactly as the Convention draft­
ers feared.  It is also possible, however, that the relative paucity of 
estate/probate cases in the datasets simply skews the numbers. 
D. Striking the Right Balance on Contract Defenses 
(for the most part) 
Article 5 of the Convention lays out an exclusive list of 
grounds on which a court may refuse enforcement or block a 
party’s ability to invoke a mediated settlement agreement in de­
fense of an attempt to relitigate the underlying dispute (what many 
jurisdictions would refer to as “recognition”).104  A detailed expli­
cation of the grounds for refusal is beyond the scope of this short 
article.  Comprehensive summaries are available elsewhere, includ­
ing essays published in the chapters in this Singapore Reference 
Book105  The chart below authored and recently published by Edna 
Sussman offers a beautifully succinct summary106: 
104 For a detailed explication of the complex negotiations regarding the absence of the word 
“recognition” from the Convention, see Schnabel, supra note 50, at 35–42. 
105 See SING. REF. BK., Michel Kallipetis, Singapore Convention Defences Based on Media­
tor’s Misconduct: Articles 5.1(e) & (f), 20 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1197 (2019); SING. REF. 
BK., Jean-Christophe Boulet, The Singapore Convention and the Metamorphosis of Contractual 
Litigation, 20 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1209 (2019); SING. REF. BK., Héctor Flores Sentı́es, 
Grounds to Refuse the Enforcement of Settlement Agreements Under the Singapore Convention 
on Mediation: Purpose, Scope, and Their Importance for the Success of the Convention, 20 CAR­
DOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1235 (2019). See also Schnabel, supra note 50, at 42–56. 
106 Sussman, supra note 78, at 52 (noting that “[t]he grounds track many, but not all, of the 
defenses available in resisting enforcement of a contract and include issues related to mediator 
conduct.”). 
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Substantive grounds Incapacity of a party to the settlement agreement,107 or 
Settlement agreement is null and void, inoperative or 
incapable of being performed under the law to which the 
parties have subjected it, or failing any indication, under 
the law applicable by the competent authority where 
relief is sought.108 
Grounds relating to the 
terms of the settlement 
agreement 
The settlement agreement is not binding, or is not final, 
according to its terms,109 or 
The settlement agreement has been subsequently 
modified,110 or 
Obligations in the settlement agreement have been 
performed111 or are not clear or comprehensible, 112 or 
Granting relief would be contrary to the terms of the 
settlement agreement.113 
Grounds relating to the 
mediator’s conduct and the 
process 
Serious breach by the mediator of standards applicable 
to the mediator or the mediation without which breach 
the party would not have entered into the settlement 
agreement,114 or 
Failure by the mediator to disclose to the parties 
circumstances that raise justifiable doubts as to the 
mediator’s impartiality or independence.115 
Sua moto/sua sponte 
grounds invokable by the 
competent authority of the 
Party to the Convention 
where relief is sought or a 
requesting party 
Granting relief would be contrary to the public policy of 
that Party,116 or 
The subject matter of the dispute is not capable of 
settlement by mediation under the law of that Party.117 
During the March 2019 symposium, more than one speaker 
emphasized the necessity to interpret these Convention grounds 
for refusal language with particular policy objectives in mind. 
Allan Stitt, the Canadian Delegate to the UNCITRAL Working 
Group, offered two very helpful framing questions: 1) Who are we 
trying to help? and 2) What are we protecting them from?  His 
answers: “We are trying to help the person who wants to enforce a 
107 Singapore Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(1)(a).
 
108 Id. art. 5(1)(b)(i).
 
109 Id. art. 5(1)(b)(ii).
 
110 Id. art. 5(1)(b)(iii).
 
111 Id. art. 5(1)(c)(i).
 
112 Id. art. 5(1)(c)(ii).
 
113 Id. art. 5(1)(d).
 
114 Id. art. 5(1)(e).
 
115 Id. art. 5(1)(f).
 
116 Id. art. 5(2)(a).
 
117 Id. art. 5(2)(b).
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mediated settlement agreement.  We are protecting that person 
from the other contracting party who wants to renege on the 
agreement.”118 
Michal Kallipetis, the IAM Delegate to the UNCITRAL 
Working Group, noted that the entire purpose of drafting the 
Convention was to avoid litigation, not encourage it.119  And he 
urged attendees to remain cognizant of three key words 
(highlighted in bold in his impressive memorable PowerPoint 
presentation) which govern all of the defenses outlined in Article 5: 
1) the word “may”, which refers to the fact that all of the 
grounds for refusal of relief are permissive, rather than 
mandatory;120 
2) the word “only”, which mandates that this permissive refusal 
authority is conditioned on the party challenging enforce­
ment meeting its burden of proof to establish entitlement to 
a refusal ground;121 and 
3) the word “proof”, which is what a party opposing enforce­
ment must offer with respect to any of the grounds.122 
Eric Tuchman, General Counsel for the American Arbitration 
Association, reminded symposium participants to remember the 
treaty’s primary promise: to give legitimacy to mediation, an ami­
cable process based on consent and self-determination that in the­
ory should not result in significant amounts of litigation. The 
assumption that litigation would be the exception rather than the 
rule came early in the Working Group deliberations, where it was 
noted that “very few settlement agreements required enforcement 
as most parties would abide by the terms of the settlement 
agreement.”123 
118 See SING. REF. BK., Allan J. Stitt, The Singapore Convention: When has a Mediation 
Taken Place (Article 4)?, 20 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1173 (2019). 
119 See Kallipetis, supra note 105. 
120 Singapore Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(1) (“The competent authority of the Party to 
the Convention where relief is sought under article 4 may refuse to grant relief at the request of 
the party against whom the relief is sought only if that party furnishes to the competent authority 
proof that . . .) (emphasis added). In other words, a court could exercise discretion to enforce an 
agreement even if a particular ground for refusal might apply. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. Moreover, the party challenging enforcement carries the burden of proof to establish 
the ground. 
123 UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of 
its sixty-third session (Vienna, 7-11 September 2015), U.N. Doc A/CN.9/861, at 8, para. 33 (Sept. 
17, 2015). See also Quek Anderson, supra note 103, para. 42 (characterizing Article 5 as “a safety 
valve to deal with instances when autonomy is compromised, but ideally one that is not fre­
quently utilized.”); Schnabel, supra note 50, at 4 (“Ideally, the Convention will rarely need to be 
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As the co-author of Disputing Irony124 and compiler of the 
two massive mediation litigation datasets described in Part II 
above, please forgive me if I take a somewhat skeptical view of the 
anticipated minimal use for the “grounds for refusal.” That said, 
all in all, with my U.S. litigation experience in mind, I feel like the 
drafters mostly got it right.125  The grounds are certainly broad 
enough to permit the wide range of “traditional” contract defenses 
parties typically raise post-mediation.  As documented in Part III 
above, disputing about those defenses has substantially declined 
over time in the United States.  That may well be the pattern under 
the Convention as well. 
More important, the grounds for refusal are intended to fore­
close defenses based on unique domestic law requirements, “such 
as any requirements that mediators be licensed in a particular juris­
diction or that mediations must be conducted under certain rules 
or by certain institutions, or that mediated settlements must be no­
tarized or meet other (extra-Convention) formal requirements.”126 
The U.S. litigation experience shows that these technical formali­
ties and procedural hoops have become the growth sector in the 
mediation litigation industry.  Cutting them off from the very be­
ginning is a very wise choice. 




As noted in the previous section, Article 5 provides for refusal 
based on mediator malfeasance.127  Specifically, Article 5(1)(e) au­
thorizes discretionary refusal to grant enforcement relief if there is 
proof of a serious breach by the mediator “of standards applicable 
to the mediator or the mediation without which breach that party 
would not have entered into the settlement agreement.”128  Article 
5(1)(f) authorizes discretionary refusal to grant enforcement relief 
based on proof the mediator failed “to disclose to the parties cir-
invoked in court, as in most cases, parties will abide by the mediated settlements they 
conclude.”). 
124 Coben & Thompson, supra note 1. 
125 See Part IV.E infra for an important caveat. 
126 Schnabel, supra note 50, at 45. 
127 Id. at 50 (characterizing these grounds for refusal as relating “less to the agreement 
reached by the disputing parties than to the conduct of the third party who helped them resolve 
the dispute, and the consequences of such conduct.”). 
128 Singapore Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(1)(e). 
1098CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION[Vol. 20:1063 
cumstances that raise justifiable doubts as to the mediator’s impar­
tiality or independence” but only if “such failure to disclose had a 
material impact or undue influence on a party without which fail­
ure that party would not have entered into the settlement 
agreement.”129 
Whether to include any defenses premised on third-party con­
duct was a topic of hot debate, with the compromise solution being 
inclusion but only in a very narrow set of circumstances.130  As suc­
cinctly summarized at the March 18, 2019 Cardozo Symposium by 
speaker Michel  Kallipetis,131 the Article 5(1)(e) defense premised 
on mediator breach of standards is significantly cabined by the re­
quirement that any alleged breach of standards be “serious” and 
proven to effectively vitiate party consent—a but/for standard that 
will be extremely difficult to prove in practice.132  Kallipetis also 
forcefully argued that the Article 5(1)(f) defense based on failure 
to make disclosures about conflicts was similarly restricted in scope 
129 Id. art. 5(1)(f). 
130 See, e.g., Sussman, supra note 78, at 49:
 
There was a particularly vigorous debate as to whether there should be any defenses
 
based on the conduct of the mediator or a mediator’s failure to make disclosures
 
related to independence and impartiality, since that would open the door to some of
 
the gamesmanship that has become problematic in the context of enforcement under
 
the New York Convention. Others felt that it was crucial that these grounds be in­
cluded in order to ensure the fairness of the mediation process. As part of the pack­
age of compromises, it was agreed that grounds related to the conduct of mediators
 
would be included as grounds for refusing to grant relief but that they would only
 
apply in narrow circumstances.
 
See also Chua, supra note 99, at 8 (describing the provisions as reflecting compromise in three 
key ways): 
First, it limits the scope of the defences to instances where the mediator’s misconduct 
or failure to disclose had a direct impact on the settlement agreement in that the 
“party would not have entered into the settlement agreement”. Second, it adjusts the 
language of the defences to highlight the exceptional circumstances that can be 
raised by using adjectives such as “serious” and “material”. Third, by having the text 
accompanying the instrument, it provides an illustrative list of examples of applicable 
standards. Although it would take the development of a substantial body of case-law 
or other pronouncements by enforcing authorities before it can be said with any cer­
tainty what types of conduct would cross the line, the words used in the defences are 
sufficient to establish that the threshold should be high. Whether or not the miscon­
duct of the mediator was such that a party would not have entered into the settle­
ment agreement without it would be a finding of fact that courts and other enforcing 
authorities are in a position to make based on available evidence. 
131 Mr. Kallipetis was the International  Academy of Mediators Delegate to the Convention 
Working Group. 
132 See also Schnabel, supra note 50, at 51–52 (highlighting, among other things, that alleged 
breaches of standards must be serious, “not just questionable conduct or a minor breach,” and 
the authority considering refusal cannot “apply standards on a post hoc basis (e.g., . . . cannot 
deny relief based on an argument that the mediator should have followed certain best practices 
or other jurisdictions’ requirements.”). 
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because of the necessity that doubts about mediator impartiality/ 
independence be “justifiable,” and even if justifiable, would only 
be actionable if those justifiable doubts had such material impact 
that without the failure to disclose the party would not have en­
tered the agreement.133 
In short, this compromised focus on mediator behavior is in 
large part likely to be entirely symbolic in practice, which is exactly 
what the track record from U.S. litigation suggests (despite the fact 
that the defense is not nearly as circumscribed under common law 
in the United States as it is in the Convention).  As Professor 
Thompson and I wrote in 2006 with respect to the 1999–2003 
dataset which, as noted above in Part III(B)(2), included just sev­
enteen cases where parties asserted mediator misconduct as a de­
fense to enforcement: 
[d]espite considerable academic ink devoted to the subject of 
mediator liability and ongoing debates about quasi-judicial and 
statutory immunity, there is a surprising dearth of cases alleging 
mediator misconduct or ethical violations.  As other authors 
have observed, the chance of a mediator being successfully sued 
is remote.  Nor is mediator misconduct commonly used as an 
enforcement defense.134 
In the 2013–2017 dataset, the total number of cases alleging a me­
diator misconduct defense was even smaller (sixteen total), with 
not a single one being successful.  In other words, much ado about 
nothing in a practical sense. 
F.	 A Defensible Choice to Decline Legislating Mediation 
Confidentiality 
The Singapore Convention does not address confidentiality, 
instead leaving this topic to be determined by applicable domestic 
law.135  In the past, I have praised the merits of uniformity in confi­
133 Id. at 53–54 (highlighting, among other things, that “‘[j]ustifiable doubts’” is intended to 
establish an objective standard, not affected by whether the party in question subjectively doubts 
the mediator’s independence and impartiality.”). 
134 Coben & Thompson, supra note 2, at 95. 
135 See Schnabel, supra note 50, at 18. While the Convention is silent on confidentiality, the 
newly approved UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Mediation and Interna­
tional Settlement Agreements Resulting From Mediation (2018) expressly authorizes disclosure 
of mediation information “for the purposes of implementation or enforcement of a settlement 
agreement.” See Article 10 Confidentiality (“Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, all informa­
tion relating to the mediation proceedings shall be kept confidential, except where disclosure is 
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dentiality regulation,136 and specifically endorsed the Uniform Me­
diation Act (“UMA”) as a statutory framework where reasonable 
exceptions to confidentiality permit parties to sensibly litigate 
about enforcement disputes.137  That said, getting global agreement 
on a single approach to this complex topic (which depending on 
jurisdiction and legal culture might involve statutes, court rules, ju­
dicial decisions, ethical codes, ADR institutional provider policies, 
and/or party contract) would likely take many more years of nego­
tiation than the three the Singapore drafters devoted to the Con­
vention.  Indeed, the drafting history of the UMA in the United 
States was a case study in the difficulty of herding cats, which in the 
end has resulted in adoption of the end product in only twelve U.S. 
jurisdictions.138 
Moreover, the U.S. litigation data suggests that confidentiality, 
an issue that impacts many aspects of mediation litigation beyond 
just enforcement, may be far less critical in the context of enforce­
ment disputes than one might assume.  Indeed, in our 2006 report 
on the 1999–2003 dataset, Professor Thompson and I highlighted a 
surprising phenomenon: 
The large volume of opinions in which courts considered de­
tailed evidence of what transpired in mediations without a confi­
required under the law or for the purposes of implementation or enforcement of a settlement 
agreement.”). U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Report of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade 
Law, Fifty-first session, U.N. Doc. A/73/, annex II (2018) (emphasis added). This confidentiality 
provision, albeit renumbered and with the word “mediation” replacing the word “conciliation,” 
is identical to Article 9 of the 2002 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Con­
ciliation. See Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on Its 
Thirty-Fifth Session, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 17, annex 1, at 54, U.N. Doc. A/57/17 
(2002). See also Draft Guide to Enactment and Use of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Interna­
tional Commercial Conciliation, U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, 35th Sess., at 1, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/514 (2002) (noting that “[a]lthough the Working Group that prepared the 
Model Law initially considered including a list of specific exceptions, it was strongly felt that 
listing exceptions in the text of the Model Law might raise difficult questions of interpretation, in 
particular as to whether the list should be regarded as exhaustive.”). 
136 See Coben, My Change of Mind on the Uniform Mediation Act, supra note 10. 
137 Id. See also COLE ET AL., supra note 11, § 8:15 (detailing the rather limited litigation his­
tory for the Uniform Mediation Act, now adopted in twelve U.S. jurisdictions) and § 8:28 (de­
tailing the litigation perils of California’s more absolute approach to mediation confidentiality 
protection). 
138 See generally COLE ET AL., supra note 11, § 8:13 and multiple secondary sources cited 
therein (noting that negotiating the Act’s confidentiality provisions “proved to be the most con­
tentious part of the Act because many interested commentators had strong but conflicting beliefs 
about the need for confidentiality in mediation and the tension among privacy, fairness and 
access to the courts” and that “[d]rafting was also difficult because over 250 state mediation 
privilege statutes existed at the time the UMA was drafted and mediators from those states 
sometimes advocated for their state’s statute.”). 
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dentiality issue being raised—either by the parties, or sua sponte 
by the court.  Indeed, uncontested mediation disclosures oc­
curred in thirty percent of all decisions in the database, cutting 
across jurisdiction, level of court, underlying subject matter, and 
litigated mediation issues.  Included are forty-five opinions in 
which mediators offered testimony, sixty-five opinions where 
others offered evidence about mediators’ statements or actions, 
and 266 opinions where parties or lawyers offered evidence of 
their own mediation communications and conduct—all without 
objection or comment.  In sum, the walls of the mediation room 
are remarkably transparent.139 
I did not code the 2013–2017 dataset with equal specificity regard­
ing source of disclosure and whether disclosure occurred without 
objection or comment.  But as detailed above in Table 12, in the 
more recent 2013–2017 dataset, litigating parties only relatively 
rarely joined enforcement and confidentiality issues in the same 
dispute.  Indeed, parties joined those two issues in enforcement de­
fense cases only 5% of the time.  And even when the issues were 
joined, the enforcement rate changed only marginally.140 
V. CONCLUSION 
If the U.S. mediation litigation experience tells us anything, it 
is that disputing about mediation is an inevitable part of institu­
tionalization of the mediation process.  As statutes, rules, and other 
regulations are created and applied, lawyers inevitably learn to ex­
ploit the rules universe on behalf of their clients. That said, with 
institutionalization has also come evolution in disputing trends. 
Perhaps most relevant to the Singapore Convention effort, the U.S. 
litigation experience suggests that party disputing about enforce­
ment will decline over time, especially challenges to mediation set­
tlement enforcement based on contract formation or fairness 
concerns.  In that respect, the drafters might take comfort in the 
hope that the primary goal of the Convention—to promote the use 
of mediation and confidence in its use—will in fact be its primary 
legacy, as opposed to ramping up the global count of mediation 
enforcement disputes. 
139 Coben & Thompson, supra note 2, at 58–59. 
140 In cases where parties disputed both confidentiality and an enforcement defense, the over­
all enforcement rate dropped from 66%, as opposed to 69% when enforcement defenses were 
raised without also litigating confidentiality. 
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